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OSPREY AIRCRAF T OF THE ACES
®
• 109
American Aces Against
the Kamikaze
Edward M Young
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
OSPREY AIRCRAF T OF THE ACES • 109
American Aces Against
the Kamikaze
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE
THE BEGINNING 6
CHAPTER TWO
OKINAWA – PRELUDE TO INVASION 31
CHAPTER THREE
THE APRIL BATTLES 44
CHAPTER FOUR
THE FINAL BATTLES 66
CHAPTER FIVE
NIGHTFIGHTERS AND NEAR ACES 83
APPENDICES 90
C O L O U R P L AT E S C O M M E N TA R Y 9 1
INDEX 95
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CHAPTER ONE
THE BEGINNING
A
t 0729 hrs on the morning of 25 October 1944, radar on the
escort carriers of Task Force 77.4.1 (call sign ‘Taffy 1’), cruising
off the Philippine island of Mindanao, picked up Japanese
aeroplanes approaching through the scattered cumulous clouds. The
carriers immediately went to General Quarters on what had already been
an eventful morning. Using the clouds as cover, the Japanese aircraft
managed to reach a point above ‘Taffy 1’ without being seen. Suddenly,
at 0740 hrs, an A6M5 Reisen dived out of the clouds directly into the
escort carrier USS
Santee
(CVE-29), crashing through its flightdeck on
the port side forward of the elevator.
Just 30 seconds later a second ‘Zeke’ dived towards the USS
Suwannee
(CVE-27), while a third targeted USS
Petrof Bay
(CVE-80) – anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) fire managed to shoot down both fighters. Then, at
0804 hrs, a fourth ‘Zeke’ dived on the
Petrof Bay,
but when hit by AAA
it swerved and crashed into the flightdeck of
Suwanee,
blowing a hole in
it forward of the aft elevator. Aboard
Santee
and
Suwannee
62 men had
been killed and 82 wounded in little more than 20 minutes.
Three hours later it was ‘Taffy 3’s’ turn to experience this new menace.
Having just narrowly escaped annihilation at the hands of the battleships
of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Central Force with the loss of only one
vessel (USS
Gambier Bay
(CVE-73)), the escort carriers of ‘Taffy 3’ came
under attack shortly before 1100 hrs. Five ‘Zeke’ fighters approached at
low altitude, then pulled up sharply to around 5000 ft and commenced
Magazines on USS
St Lo
(CVE-63)
explode after the first ever kamikaze
attack on 25 October 1944.
St Lo
sank within 30 minutes of being hit
(National Museum of Naval Aviation
(NMNA))
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their dives onto their targets. USS
Kitkun Bay
(CVE-71) was the first to
be hit when a ‘Zeke’ dived directly at the ship’s bridge, passed over the
island, hit the port catwalk and crashed into the sea alongside the vessel.
Two more ‘Zekes’ then targeted USS
White Plains
(CVE-66), pulling
out of their dives when faced with a wall of AAA. One came back to
attack
White Plains
again, crashing just alongside.
At 1052 hrs the second ‘Zeke’, on fire from AAA hits, dove on USS
St Lo
(CVE-63) and crashed through its flightdeck into the hangar deck
below, setting off the vessel’s magazines in a huge explosion. Fatally
damaged,
St Lo
sank 29 minutes later at the cost of 114 lives. Three
‘Zekes’ then attacked USS
Kalinin Bay
(CVE-68), one hitting the
flightdeck before crashing overboard, the second striking the port stack
and catwalk and the third missing the carrier to the port side.
The sailors and airmen of Task Force (TF) 77.4’s escort carriers had
been witnesses to Japan’s new weapon of desperation – the first organised
employment of pilots to deliberately crash their aircraft into American
warships at the sacrifice of their lives. That morning the attacking
Japanese aviators dove into their targets with no chance, or intention,
of escape in an act that was incomprehensible to most Americans.
To them, it was simple suicide, and the actions of the Japanese pilots
were deemed to be suicide attacks – a term that came to be used
to describe any attempt to crash into an Allied naval ship. Shortly after
these initial attacks a new term would enter the American military
vocabulary – kamikaze.
THE BEGINNING
O
RIGIN
OF THE
K
AMIKAZE
‘If only we might fall,
Like cherry blossoms in the Spring,
So pure and radiant!’
This was the haiku of a kamikaze pilot killed in February 1945 that was
quoted in Ivan Morris’
The Nobility of Failure.
The kamikaze emerged from Japan’s increasingly desperate military
predicament, the failure of its conventional forces and long-standing
Japanese cultural traditions. The loss of Saipan and the defeat of the
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) in June 1944 was a devastating blow that
brought a reconsideration of Japan’s future strategy. It was clear that the
Americans would continue their inexorable advance across the Pacific,
and it seemed that there was little the Japanese military could do to stop
them. Japan’s connections to its Southeast Asian sources of fuel and vital
raw materials for its war industries were now directly threatened.
Having cast the conflict as a battle of annihilation between Japan and
the Western countries – a battle ‘to determine who shall devour and who
shall be devoured’ – the Japanese military saw no alternative but to
continue the war. It was hoped that some way could be found to force
the US military into a decisive battle that would inflict punishing losses
on American forces leading to a Japanese victory. With both the army
and navy expecting the next American operation to be an invasion of the
Philippines, the Imperial General Headquarters in Japan agreed to
commit the maximum number of troops, ships and aircraft possible in
order to obtain certain victory.
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