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Metaphor and Symbol, 23:
50–82, 2008
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 1092-6488 print / 1532-7868 online
DOI: 10.1080/10926480701723607
Darwin’s Metaphors Revisited:
Conceptual Metaphors, Conceptual Blends,
and Idealized Cognitive Models in the
Theory of Evolution
Abdulsalam Al-Zahrani
Binghamton University—SUNY
Darwin’s book
On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection
(hence-
forth
The Origin)
abounds with metaphors. In fact, the very theory of natural
selection is couched in a system of metaphors that exhibit striking consistency
and coherence. I argue that the phenomenon for which Darwin tries to detect the
basic mechanisms, that is, biological evolution, involves vast, indeterminate, and
ambiguous observations that are difficult to subject to the empirical methods. This
fact motivates Darwin’s extensive use of metaphors to organize his observations,
structure the vague concepts, and ultimately render his observations meaningful and
intelligible. I demonstrate that Darwin’s metaphors, as far as they are elements of
Idealized Cognitive Models, prove valuable in achieving this goal. First, I identify
the conceptual metaphors underlying the main metaphorical expressions and show
how these conceptual metaphors give rise to entailments and inferences central
to Darwin’s theory. The conceptual metaphors I identify are
“NATURE IS A
MOTHER,” “NATURE IS A BREEDER,” “LIFE IS WAR,” “LIFE IS A RACE,”
and
“EVOLUTION IS PROGRESS.”
I also comment briefly on the conceptual
blending involved in these metaphorical mappings. I then turn to characterizing
the idealized cognitive models (ICMs) that function as the pre-conceptual ground
in virtue of which Darwin’s metaphors are meaningful, coherent, and helpful to
scientific thinking. These ICMs are the ICM of STRUGGLE and the image-schema
of SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Abdulsalam Al-Zahrani, Binghamton University,
Department of Anthropology, P. O. Box 6000, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USA. E-mail:
aalzahr1@binghamton.edu
DARWIN’S METAPHORS
51
INTRODUCTION
The cognitive-linguistic theory of metaphor envisages thought/cognition and
metaphor/language as the two sides of a single indivisible structure that is
grounded in the preconceptual structures of our bodily experience—or, for some
cases, in our cultural practices—and which gives rise to varieties of metaphorical
expressions, conventional as well as novel (Johnson, 1987; Kovecses, 2005;
Lakoff, 1987, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). This may be translated
visually into the following three-level diagram in which the vector of motivation
moves upward from the lowest level of pre-conceptual structures to conceptual
metaphors to the surface manifestations, that is, metaphorical expressions, while
the vector of explanation moves downward, in the opposite direction.
Metaphorical Expressions
Vector of Explanation
Conceptual Metaphor
Vector of Motivation
Pre-conceptual Structure
The intermediate level involves complex processes of mappings between
conceptual domains or mental spaces that result in what Fauconnier and other
cognitive scientists call conceptual integrations or conceptual blending. There
is a variety of conceptual blend ranging from simple single-scope blend to
multiple-scope blend (Fauconnier, 1994, 1997; Kovecses, 2005).
The central premise of cognitive linguistics, as regards metaphors, consists,
therefore, in the assertion that metaphors are conceptual in nature. This means
that for the most part human reasoning as it is actually done is metaphorical
(Johnson, 1987, p. 11). Furthermore, metaphorical concepts develop out of
preconceptual bodily experience (and cultural practices). A great part of our
conceptual system is not disembodied formal representations but emerges from
our bodily experience (Gibbs, 2006; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff &
Johnson, 1999). It follows that humans do not experience the real world but,
rather, a projected world (Lakoff, 1987; cf. Jackendoff, 1983, 1992), a world
constructed by the biological nature of the human body and its interaction with
the world (Gibbs, 2006; cf. Maturana & Varela, 1991).
A question then arises as to the cognitive import of metaphor in scientific
thought and, in particular, that of Darwin’s metaphors, the subject matter of
this paper. Leary (1990) supplied numerous instances of scientific metaphors,
52
AL-ZAHRANI
including Darwin’s own; yet despite his emphasis on the ubiquity, creativity,
and conceptuality of metaphor one finds neither an explicit account of these
characteristics nor an empirical grounding of metaphor in bodily experience,
both of which are cogently formulated only in the cognitive theory of metaphor.
Similarly, Young (1971a, 1971b, 1985) wrote extensively on Darwin’s metaphors
especially on the natural selection metaphor. His treatments, however, remained
within the confines of the history of ideas and philosophy of science. The logic of
metaphorical mappings, conceptual blends, conceptual entailment and inferences,
and above all the embodiment of thought and language are nowhere to be found
in his treatment.
At a more abstract level, Richard Boyed contends that there is a species of
scientific metaphors that he calls theory-constitutive metaphors, which function
to ostensively fix the reference, suggest strategies for future research, and invite
the reader to the similarities and analogies between features of primary and
secondary subjects, including features not yet discovered or not yet fully under-
stood (Boyed, 1979). I argue that Darwin’s metaphors belong to this category of
scientific metaphors and reflect the central premises of the cognitive theory of
metaphor. Thus, I argue that Darwin’s theory of evolution is couched in a system
of metaphors in which the concepts of NATURE, LIFE, and EVOLUTION are
metaphorically structured in terms of other concepts; that the basic metaphors of
The Origin
are elements of idealized cognitive models (ICMs), and these exhibit
the typical characteristics predicted by the ICM theory. That is to say, that the
ICMs may or may not fit the world and that they are structured gestalts used to
interpret and understand experience. That ICMs may or may not fit the world
is only natural for any metaphorical mapping highlights some aspects of our
experience and hides others.
That said, a precautionary remark is in order at the outset to avoid misunder-
standing. This paper does not aim at refuting or invalidating Darwin’s theory by
saying “look, the theory of natural selection is metaphorical, therefore it is false,”
for the approach I adopt does not draw a sharp line between literal true reasoning
and metaphorical false reasoning. On the contrary, it views metaphor as pervasive
mode of language and metaphorical thinking as too natural and ubiquitous to
be readily recognizable. Indeed, considering the philosophical premises of this
approach, metaphorical reasoning is the norm discernable in both everyday life
discourse and scientific discourse. In what follows I first discuss the theory of
natural selection as expressed in a central passage in
The Origin
and subsequently
present aspects of the dispute between Darwin and his critics over the metaphor
of natural selection. Second, I explicate Darwin’s major metaphors in terms of
the conceptual metaphor theory and the conceptual blend theory. Third, I expand
on the ICMs underlying Darwin’s metaphors in virtue of which the metaphors
of
The Origin
are meaningful, intelligible, and constitutive of the theory of
evolution. Fourth, I demonstrate the integratedness of the ICM of struggle, which
DARWIN’S METAPHORS
53
I take as the central ICM in Darwin’s theory. Finally, in the conclusion I reflect
on some of the implications of the analysis advanced in this paper.
THE THEORY OF NATURAL SELECTION
From the inherent contradiction between the geometric rate of reproduction and
the limited environmental resources there ensues a struggle for existence, the
most primary condition under which all organisms live. Since the individuals of a
species exhibit clear variations in their morphological organization, physiological
functioning, and behavioral patterns, some of which are advantageous while
others are disadvantageous, not all the individuals survive the condition of
struggle for life. Only the fittest survive the struggle for existence. The fittest of
these organisms will be able, according to the law of inheritance, to pass their
adaptive characters to their offspring. It is through the elimination of maladaptive
characteristics and preservation of the adaptive characteristics that species appear
and change over time. Darwin’s theory of evolution can be found epitomized
in the following excerpt form
The Origin,
on which I mark in boldface the
terms that signify the turns of reasoning, logical structure, and the conclusions.
Darwin’s basic metaphors are in italic.
If
under changing conditions of life organic beings present individual differences
in almost every part of their structure, and this
cannot be disputed; if
there be,
owing to their geometrical rate of increase, a severe
struggle for life,
at some
age, season, or year, and this certainly
cannot be disputed; then,
considering
the infinite complexity of the relation of all organic beings to each other and to
their condition of life, causing an infinite diversity in structure, constitution, and
habits, to be advantageous to them,
it would be a most extraordinary fact if no
variation had ever occurred useful to each being’s own welfare,
in the same
manner as so many variations have occurred useful to man. But if variations useful
to any organic being ever do occur,
assuredly individuals thus characterized
will have the best chance of being preserved in the struggle for life;
and from
the strong principle of inheritance these will tend to produce offspring similarly
characterized. This principle of preservation, or the
survival of the fittest,
I have
called,
Natural Selection.
It leads to the
improvement
of each creature in relation
to its organic and inorganic conditions of life; and consequently, in most cases,
to what must be regarded as an advance in organization. (Darwin, 1993, p. 168
emphasis added)
1
The passage contains the following points:
Quotations from the
On the Origin of Species
are all from the sixth edition republished by
Random House, Inc. 1993.
1
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AL-ZAHRANI
•
The first “if” introduces the idea that organisms exhibit variations inter-
and intra-species.
•
The second “if” introduces the idea that organisms reproduce in a rate that
exceeds the sustenance capacity of the world they come to populate.
•
“Then” draws the conclusion that the individual variations are either
adaptive or maladaptive.
•
From 1 and 2 there follows the struggle for existence. And since variations
imply differential adaptive values only the fittest survives the condition of
struggle. This is the conclusion introduced by the word “assuredly.”
•
The survivors “replicate” themselves through reproducing offspring with
similarly advantageous characteristics. Moreover, these characteristics are
improvement and advancement.
This is what Darwin calls the theory of “descent with modification by natural
selection.” It is a consequence “of one general law leading to the advancement of
all organic beings—namely, multiply, vary, let the strongest live, and the weakest
die” (Darwin, 1993, p. 360). In the passage quoted above there are a number of
metaphors that, I contend, constitute a system of interrelated metaphors central
to and constitutive of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Before embarking on a close
analysis of these metaphors I want to dwell briefly on the dispute over Darwin’s
metaphor of
“NATURAL SELECTION”
and the significance of this dispute for
the analysis that follows.
DISPUTE OVER THE “NATURAL SELECTION” METAPHOR
No metaphor is so striking in its conformity to the fact that metaphor embodies
untranslatable cognitive content as the metaphor of natural selection. Darwin
refused with admirable scientific zeal to yield to sympathetic as well as unsympa-
thetic criticisms of his contemporaries. Alfred Russell Wallace wrote a friendly
letter to Darwin saying “I am led to conclude that the term [natural selection]
itself, and your mode of illustrating it, however clear and beautiful to many of
us, are yet not the best adopted to impress it on the general naturalist public”
(Quoted in Young, 1971a, p. 472). Wallace published his opinion about the
term in “Creation by Law” under the title “Mr. Darwin’s metaphors liable to
Misconception.” Some naturalists accused Darwin of something like blindness
for being unable to see “that Natural Selection requires the constant watching
of an intelligent ‘chooser,’ like man’s selection.” Another naturalist complained,
in a letter to Darwin, about the same difficulty that arises “almost entirely from
your choice of the term ‘natural selection’ and so constantly comparing it in its
effects to Man’s Selection, and also your so frequently personifying nature as
“selecting,” as “perfecting” as “seeking the good of the species” (Young, 1971a,

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